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Abstract 
We map the pattern and extent of the European integration of core state powers (coercive force, public 
finance, and public administration) and analyze causes and consequences. We highlight two findings: 
First, in contrast to historical examples of federal state building, where the nationalization of core state 
powers precipitated the institutional, territorial and political consolidation of the emerging state, the 
European integration of core state powers is associated with the institutional, territorial and political 
fragmentation of the EU. Second, in contrast to European market integration, state elites and mass 
publics, not organized business interests, are the prime drivers of integration. 
Keywords 
Core state powers; differentiated integration; integration theory; new intergovernmentalism; 
politicization; state elites 
 1 
Investigating the integration of core state powers * 
The literature on European integration has its own business cycle. 10 years ago, the common wisdom 
was that the Maastricht Treaty had ushered the European Union (EU) into a stable constitutional 
equilibrium that was unlikely to be upset soon (Hix 2007: 143–144; Moravcsik 2005: 349). Today, the 
common wisdom holds that Maastricht has unleashed new dynamics of fundamental change that are 
unlikely to abate soon. Some scholars diagnose the rise of a ‘new intergovernmentalism’ that overlies 
and partly displaces the supranational actors and institutions of the traditional community method 
(Bickerton et al. 2014). Others note the creeping territorial differentiation of EU integration: national 
opt-outs are an increasingly normal feature of EU policy-making (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014). 
Yet others are concerned with the politicization of EU policies and institutions. They observe an 
increasing spilloverspill of EU issues from technocratic elite arenas into the public sphere, the rise of a 
Euroskeptic constraining dissensus and the emergence of salient domestic cleavages over EU issues 
(Hooghe and Marks 2009).  
In this paper, we conjecture that these seemingly isolated trends all flow from the same cause: the 
European integration of core state powers. By this we mean the increasing involvement of EU 
institutions in key functions of sovereign government including money and fiscal affairs, defense and 
foreign policy, migration, citizenship, and internal security. We discuss this conjecture theoretically 
and present preliminary evidence to support it. Our analysis is organized around three sets of 
questions. What is the pattern and extent of EU involvement in core state powers (section 2)? What are 
the political and institutional consequences of this involvement (section 3)? Which actor constellations 
drive and shape it (section 4)?  
Pattern and extent 
Statebuilding in early modern Europe revolved around the nationalization of three key action 
resources: coercive power, the power to coin money, raise taxes and issue debt, and the administrative 
capacity to implement and enforce public laws and policies within national borders (Bartolini 2005; 
Marks 1997). Arguably, these three resources still constitute the core powers of the state today. They 
provide the basis of ‘domestic sovereignty’ (Krasner 1999) and the wherewithal for the wide-ranging 
activities of the modern state. Without these powers, it is difficult to be a ‘proper’ state. Their 
integration has therefore been equated to a ‘self-abdication’ of the state (Hoffmann 1966: 866). We 
consider three indicators to assess the pattern and extent of this alleged self-abdication: The EU’s 
formal authority over core state powers, the EU’s material capacity building for the European-level 
exercise of core state powers, and the EU’s regulation of national core state powers.  
Formal authority 
Starting with the Single European Act, the EU’s treaty mandate has gradually expanded into areas of 
core state powers. While the scope for majority voting and supranational agency is generally more 
restricted than in market integration (Figure 1), it has increased greatly over the past few decades. On 
average, decision-making is as supranational in core state powers today as it used to be in market 
integration during the 1990s. From Figure 1, at least, it is not obvious that the EU has reached any 
kind of constitutional equilibrium. 
                                                     
*
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Figure 1: Formal EU authority in market regulation and Core State Powers  
 
Data: Leuffen et al. 2013, own calculations. Notes: Core State Powers include Political External 
Relations; Criminal and Domestic Security; Macroeconomic & Employment; Money; Tax. Market 
regulation includes Economic External Relations; Environmental & Consumer Protection; 
Occupational Health; Labor; R&D; Economic Freedoms; Competition & Industry; Energy & 
Transport; Agriculture; Social & Territorial Cohesion. Formal authority distinguishes five grades 
of treaty-based EU involvement in policy-making (Börzel 2005): 0=no coordination at EU level, 
1=intergovernmental coordination, 2=intergovernmental cooperation, 3=joint decision-making 
with limited European Parliament (EP) involvement, 4=joint decision-making with full EP 
involvement, 5=supranational centralization) 
Capacity building 
The conspicuous expansion of the EU’s formal, treaty-based authority in core state powers was not 
accompanied by an equally conspicuous build-up of material capacities for the centralized exercise of 
such powers. As many observers highlight (e.g. Börzel 2005: 224; Moravcsik 2001: 169–173), the EU 
lacks the key action resources of the modern state. It has no army or police force. Its administrative 
capacity is tiny. The Commission employs just under 25,000 officials
1
 compared, for instance, to the 
US Department of Commerce’s 44,000 (Bruszt and Langbein 2014: 15). The EU has no taxing power 
and cannot issue debt. Its budget is comparatively small and shrinking (from roughly 1.2 per cent of 
EU GNI in 1997 to roughly 1 percent in 2014). Only in monetary affairs does the EU enjoy quasi 
state-like powers, even though tightly constrained by treaty provisions prohibiting their use for 
purposes of macroeconomic steering and fiscal stabilization.
2
 
                                                     
1
 Source: Adopted budget for the financial year 2014; OJ L51 of 21/02/2014 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/www/index-
en.htm, last accessed 5 February 2015. 
2
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price stability to other macroeconomic goals, and TFEU Arts. 123 and 125 prohibiting the monetary financing of public 
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On closer inspection, however, EU capacities have expanded more than this minimalist picture 
reveals. Obviously, the Eurozone crisis did not produce a dramatic Hamiltonian moment of general 
debt Europeanization, yet it led to the creation of a permanent European emergency fund, the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), with a lending capacity of up to 500 billion Euros and a bank 
resolution fund of, ultimately, 55 billion Euros. The Commission gained a limited right to issue bonds 
(currently about 60 billion Euros), and the European Central Bank stretched, and possibly 
overstretched, its treaty mandate to provide fiscal assistance to distressed member states. The 
‘quantitative easing’ program of January 2015 has a volume of 1.3 trillion Euros. Similarly, despite 
the lack of a common army, the EU has staged 9 purely military missions since 2003, and has 
maintained, on average, 3,260 soldiers in foreign operations every year (Krotz and Wright 2014). 
Since 2010, it also commands a ‘quasi-supranational diplomatic corps’ (Adler-Nissen 2014: 664), the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), which equals the size of that of a mid-sized member state, 
such as Belgium, and challenges the member states’ monopoly of foreign representation. In public 
administration, some observers see a relentless process of ‘executive center formation’, driven by the 
doubling of the Commission personnel, the tripling of the number of EU agencies since the 1990s 
(Trondal 2014), and the emergence of large bureaucracies in the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the Court. Currently, roughly 56,000 people work for EU 
institutions
3
, supported by roughly 62,000 national bureaucrats who regularly descend on Brussels to 
coordinate with the Commission and with each other (Eurofacts 2008; Wessels 2000). This is still a 
small administrative superstructure for an area of almost 500 million people. But it is decidedly larger 
than the administration of the proverbial mid-sized European city.  
Regulation 
What the EU lacks in terms of material capacity, it partly compensates by regulation. On the one hand, 
the EU uses regulation to harness national core state powers for joint European purposes. In the 
military field, soft laws, such as the Headline Goals or the European Defense Agency’s (EDA) codes 
of conduct serve to nudge member states into developing complementary and interoperable military 
capabilities, on which the EU (or NATO) can draw for joint military missions (Mérand and Angers 
2014). In public administration, hard regulations oblige national bureaucracies to ensure the consistent 
implementation of EU policies that the EU cannot guarantee through its own bureaucratic resources. 
By forcing national administrators to provide and accept administrative inputs to and from each other 
(e.g. under the services directive or tax administration), these regulations break open formerly closed 
national systems of public administration, divest them of their operational independence, and fuse 
them into a transnational European administrative space (Hofmann 2008; Wessels 2000).  
On the other hand, the EU uses regulation to constrain externalities of the national exercise of core 
state powers. For instance, it regulates how the member states use their policing powers (Herschinger 
et al. 2011) to prevent ‘crime shopping’ in a borderless market. The Stability and Growth Pact and the 
various post-crisis fiscal regulations building on it restrict national fiscal autonomy so as to prevent 
spillover effects from unsustainable national deficits and debt. The intrusiveness of these fiscal 
regulations is ‘beyond the writ of anyone in Washington’ (Hallerberg 2014: 102), precisely because 
Washington’s fiscal capacities are beyond the writ of anyone in Brussels. The United States (US) 
federal government can afford to regulate the fiscal conduct of state governments lightly because the 
predominance of its own fiscal resources reduces the importance of state-level tax and spend policies 
(Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2011: 305). The EU regulates more because the member states are the 
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undertakings (5,636), European Parliament (6,786), Council (3,101), Court of Justice (1,991), External Action Service 
(1,661), ECB (1,907), European Investment Bank (EIB) (2,124), civilian and military missions (5,029), other bodies 
including the Economic and Social Committee, Committee of the Regions, etc. (2,605). 
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dominant fiscal powers and, consequently, the externalities between their fiscal policies are potentially 
much more disruptive than those between US state governments.  
In conclusion, EU involvement in the exercise of core state powers has become a normal feature of 
the European constitution and of European politics. The extent of integration is still limited. However, 
this is also common in national ‘coming-together federations’ (Stepan 1999) especially in early phases 
of development. In Germany, for instance, the national government lacked a general taxing power 
until after World War I, and the US federal government was so weak for most of the 19
th
 century that 
the country was commonly referred to in the plural rather than in the singular (‘the United States are’ 
rather than ‘the United States is’; Sbragia 1992: 260, Fn. 7). By American standards, the EU’s 
influence on core state powers is increasing fast (Kelemen 2014). What is peculiar about the EU case 
is not the limited extent of integration so much as the pattern. The very strong reliance on regulatory 
means of integration is unusual. To the extent that the EU has genuine capacities in core state powers 
at all, they do not usually serve for the direct exercise of fiscal, administrative or military functions at 
the European level but for the mobilization and coordination of national powers. The ESM, for 
instance, is not intended to replace national fiscal policy but to provide the minimal risk pooling 
necessary for keeping fiscal policy making national in a supranational monetary union. The aim is to 
assist fiscal self-help not to promote fiscal centralization.  
Political and institutional consequences 
The European integration of core state powers is closely related to three trends of change that clearly 
distinguish it from historical processes of state building: institutional fragmentation, territorial 
differentiation, and political segmentation. 
Institutional fragmentation 
In historical processes of state building, the nationalization of core state powers was associated with 
the eventual consolidation of core institutions of national government and a centralization of control 
(Skowronek 1982). In Europe by contrast, the integration of core state powers is associated with a 
proliferation of EU institutions and a dispersion of control.  
While the Lisbon Treaty formally abolished the pillar structure of the Maastricht Treaty, special 
rules continue to apply to core state powers: Foreign and defense policy remains subject to almost 
purely intergovernmental decision rules with little role for the Commission, the Court and the 
Parliament (Title V TEU). Justice and home affairs, while communitarized more strongly, also remain 
subject to special rules providing, inter alia, for unanimity voting in the Council, unilateral ‘emergency 
breaks’ (Art. 82(3) and 87(3) TFEU), and limits to the Commission’s right of legislative initiative 
(Art. 76 TFEU) (see Peers 2012 for a review).  
Another perhaps more important instance of fragmentation is the proliferation of EU institutions. 
The move into core state powers was associated with the rise of new intergovernmental decision-
making bodies above the Council of Ministers (the European Council), besides it (e.g. the Eurogroup) 
and below it (e.g. the Political and Security Committee or the Standing Committee on Internal 
Security). As a consequence, the Council lost its old focality in intergovernmental decision making. At 
the same time, new supranational agents such as the President of the European Council and the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy challenge the Commission’s preeminence as 
agenda setter, mediator and process manager in European policy making. During the Eurozone crisis, 
for instance, it had to struggle hard with the van Rompuy Task Force over the reform agenda for fiscal 
surveillance and regulation (Bauer and Becker 2014: 219). Also, the Commission’s status as the EU’s 
central bureaucracy is eroding. To the extent the integration of core state powers involves the creation 
of new supranational capacity, the member states often prefer vesting it into task-specific ‘de novo’ 
EU bodies (Bickerton et al. 2014) and not the Commission. Examples include banking supervision 
More integration, less federation: The European integration of core state powers 
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(ECB), diplomatic representation (EEAS), emergency lending (ESM), and a host of implementation 
and surveillance tasks assigned to more than 30 EU regulatory and executive agencies. The majority of 
EU staff now works outside the Commission. 
While most de novo bodies operate under EU law, others like the ESM or the new Single Bank 
Resolution Fund, are based on international law treaties (Dawson and de Witte 2013). Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the likelihood of a new body being set up under international law increases in 
relation to the material capacities entrusted to this body (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014: 253). 
Hence, to the extent, that the EU draws on supranational capacities, these capacities are not always 
legally hers. This is perhaps most obvious in military and fiscal affairs. Important EU military 
missions have been directed from NATO headquarters in Belgium, and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) was involved in a major way in funding and supervising EU policy responses to the 
Eurozone crisis.  
The integration of core state powers has led to the rise of new EU institutions alongside, and partly 
in competition to, the central institutions of the traditional Community Method (the Commission and 
the Council of Ministers). This leaves the EU institutionally fragmented to an extent that, when it wins 
the Nobel Prize, it has to send three Presidents to collect it because no single one can claim to 
represent the EU as a whole. The US federal government is also an ‘organizational mess’ (Moe 1990: 
238). Yet this mess was created by two central institutions (Congress and Presidency) that remained 
visibly and uncontested above it. In the EU case, by contrast, the fragmentation extends to the central 
institutions.  
Territorial differentiation 
In historical examples of European state building, the nationalization of coercive, fiscal and 
administrative powers was closely associated with the territorial consolidation of the state. In fact, the 
former is usually considered a crucial precondition of the latter (e.g. Bartolini 2005: 60–63). In the 
EU, by contrast, the integration of core state powers is associated with territorial differentiation and 
increasingly fuzzy external borders.  
Territorial differentiation refers to the opting-out of individual member states from EU policies. 
Exaggerating slightly, it was invented for the purpose of integrating core state powers (Leuffen et al. 
2013; Rittberger et al. 2014). While opt-outs are virtually absent in market-related policy areas, they 
are a normal feature of EU policies in core state power: 9 member states do not currently participate in 
European Monetary Union (EMU),
4
 6 member states do not fully participate in EU policies on justice 
and home affairs,
5
 and Denmark has opted out of EU defense cooperation. In all these cases, the EU’s 
formal authority over core state powers is limited to subsets of member states. This differentiation is 
partly transitory. Some Eastern European member states do not participate in EMU or the Schengen 
area because they are not yet ready and able to do so. However, the differentiation is partly durable 
(Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014): Denmark, Sweden or the United Kingdom (UK), at least, are 
fundamentally unwilling, rather than just temporarily unable, to join the Eurozone. 
Territorial differentiation is often a matter of degree. It tends to vary with the instruments of 
integration (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014: 255). Generally, it seems to be more pronounced in 
capacity building than in regulation. In fiscal policy, for instance, only the 19 member states of the 
Eurozone participate in, and contribute capital to, the ESM while the rules of the Stability and Growth 
Pact and the Six Pack apply to all 28 EU member states, and the rules of the Fiscal Compact to 26 
member states.
6
 The Single Bank Resolution Fund is restricted to the Eurozone members but operates 
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 Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the UK.  
5
 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Romania and the UK.  
6
 However, the rules of the Two Pack also only apply to Eurozone member states.  
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in a regulatory framework for all EU member states. Likewise in military affairs: The rules on defense 
procurement apply to all 28 member states, and the ‘Headline Goals’, for national force planning, 
apply to 27 member states (all but Denmark). Yet only 20 member states, on average, contribute 
troops and funding to EU military missions.
7
  
Importantly, there is no uniform geographical pattern of differentiation: while some member states, 
including, most notably, the six founding members, regularly opt-in to EU policies, it is not always the 
same member states that opt-out. The differentiation process does not produce two distinct groups of 
ins and outs but creates a multitude of partly overlapping, policy-specific ‘variable geometries’ of 
integration that render the outer perimeter of the EU fuzzy and diffuse (Leuffen et al. 2013: 19).  
Political segmentation 
The integration of core state powers correlates with the level of media attention to, and the political 
contestation of, European issues. The level of politicization was high in the early 1950s, when the 
rearmament of Germany and the creation of a European Defense Community were at stake. It 
decreased with the turn to market integration in the late 1950s, even though flaring up intermittingly 
when ‘constitutional issues’, such as the British entry, were at stake. It rose again with the introduction 
of monetary union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the integration of justice and home 
affairs in the 1990s (Grande and Kriesi forthcoming).  
Contrary to the historical experience of federal state formation in the USA or Germany (Steinbach 
1984), the politicization of EU policies precipitated neither a shift of mass loyalties to the European 
level nor the advent of transnational mass politics organized along cross-cutting cleavages. Media 
discourses remain nationally segmented, despite increased media attention to EU issues and 
institutions (Offerhaus et al. 2014). The home country remains the key reference point of individual 
self-identification, even for people supporting European integration. Party politics and systems of 
interest intermediation remain dominated by national organizations (Bartolini 2005). The main 
political conflicts remain territorially defined, despite the increasing pooling of authority at the 
European level. To the extent, that European issues raise political conflict, they tend to divide 
European citizens along national borders, not across them (Grande and Kriesi forthcoming).  
The integration of core state powers fuels the nationally segmented politicization of EU policy-
making in two ways. First, to the extent, that it bestows the EU with an important insignia of stateness, 
it stirs conflict between Euroskeptic and Europhile citizens and political groups. Euroskeptics 
generally oppose EU involvement in core state powers because they want to keep stateness as an 
exclusively national attribute. Europhiles support it because they hope to increase the stateness of the 
EU. We conjecture that a politicization of the cleavage between Euroskeptics and Europhiles is 
particularly likely if the issue involves European capacity building because capacity building involves 
a visible reallocation of ownership rights over core state powers to the European level. Regulatory 
integration is less prone to politicization because it only strengthens European control rights over 
power resources that remain notionally national. The façade of national statehood remains intact.  
Second, the integration of core state powers contributes to a nationally segmented politicization of 
EU policies by stirring conflict between national publics. Again, we expect this conflict to be more 
visible and virulent in cases of integration by capacity building. The creation of joint capacities 
immediately raises the question of who pays and who benefits. Since issues of resource allocation are 
decided intergovernmentally, EU citizens tend to conceive this question in national terms. The ‘juste 
retour’ perspective has structured public debates over the EU budget ever since Margaret Thatcher 
claimed ‘my money back’ in 1984. The most divisive conflicts during the Eurocrisis concerned the 
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 The Athena funding mechanism, to which all 27 participating members states contribute, in relation to their Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), only covers about 10% of a mission’s operation costs (Mérand and Angers 2014: 54). 
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distribution of adjustment burdens between creditor and debtor countries. While, for instance, 
majorities of citizens supported financial aid to other member states, they insisted on strict aid 
conditionality (Risse 2014: 1210): Most Germans were prepared to pay for Greece – but only on 
German terms to be enforced on them.  
Regulatory integration, by contrast, tends to conceal the distributive implications of integration by 
imposing the same formal constraints on all member states. Compliance with these regulatory 
constraints is construed as a national problem to be solved by each member state individually. This 
deflects media attention and political conflict from the European rules to the national strategies of 
implementing them. In cases of blatant non-compliance, the regulatory nationalization of 
responsibility for joint policies fuels self-righteous indignation and cross-border finger-pointing by 
compliant and non-compliant member states alike, be it in fiscal policy or in dealing with migrants or 
refugees.  
Contrary to Eurofederalist expectations, the integration of core state powers does not contribute to 
‘an ever closer union’ and a more federal Europe, but drives the people of Europe apart and leaves the 
EU territorially and institutionally fragmented. The more the EU is involved in the policy fields that 
define the state, the more obvious its enduring difference to the state become. Yet, there is significant 
variation across core state powers. The extent of institutional fragmentation, territorial differentiation 
and mass politicization seems to be particularly strong in monetary and fiscal policy, more moderate in 
internal security, and foreign and defense affairs, and virtually absent in public administration. There 
also seems to be variation across policy instruments: EU capacity building seems to evoke more 
differentiation, and stronger fragmentation and politicization than EU regulation. Finally, most 
fundamentally, the trends towards differentiation, fragmentation and politicization are virtually limited 
to the integration of core state powers. Why? What is the difference to market integration? 
Actor constellations  
The traditional theories of integration, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism were 
calibrated to explain market integration. Despite well-known differences, their explanatory core is 
quite similar. They both assume that governmental preferences for (or against) integration are mostly 
economic, and reflect the position of dominant sectoral business interests (e.g. Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012). Whatever the merits of this model for 
explaining market integration, it is less useful for explaining the integration of core state powers. 
Business interests tend to be less affected than in market integration, state elites tend to be affected 
more, and the likelihood of mass politicization tends to be higher. We extend the standard model to 
include state elites and mass publics, and explicitly theorize their impact on governmental preference 
formation.  
States elites  
The creation of EMU, the handling of the Euro-crisis, and the liberalization of European defense 
markets involved heavy lobbying by private industry because they had important and fairly obvious 
commercial implications for important business sectors (Niemann and Ioannou 2015; Weiss 2014). 
The fiscal regulation of national budgets, through the Stability and Growth Pact and more recently the 
European Semester, arguably also affects the competitive positions of private business but the effects 
are complex, indirect and hard to predict. This tends to mute business lobbying (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig 2009: 76). Finally, in foreign and defense policy, internal security, or public 
administration, there is no business lobbying at all, simply because there is no market and hence no 
market players with direct stakes in the integration process. Issue-specific interdependence may still 
shape government preferences in a major way (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis 1999: 61–62) but not 
through their effect on domestic business interests but through their impact on state elites.  
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State elites include all non-elected professionals who are formally responsible for the handling of 
national core state powers and derive status and income from it (Skocpol 1985: 9-14) – e.g. diplomats, 
high ranking civil servants, military officers, central bankers, policy experts and advisers. State elites 
will support integration to the extent that this serves their institutional and functional interests (Scharpf 
1988). Institutional interests refer to a general preference for preserving and strengthening the 
government institution or bureaucracy on whom individual members of the state elite depend for their 
livelihood and career; Functional interests refer to a general preference for ‘making the policies work’ 
for which individual members of the state elite are responsible and on which their professional 
reputation and career prospects depend (Downs 1967). Examples of state elites pushing for more 
integration include military professionals hoping to accelerate domestic military reform by increasing 
European pressure, diplomats in search of a European turf that is safe from encroachment by finance 
ministries, civil servants making a career out of liaising between EU institutions and national 
administrations, high police officials depending on foreign information to do a proper job at home, and 
central bankers colluding at the European level to increase their independence from political controls 
(Deflem 2000; Heidbreder 2014; Mérand and Angers 2014; Wessels 1998).  
Yet, state elites do not support integration unconditionally. They will oppose integration moves that 
threaten their interests. The perhaps most basic interest concerns the survival of their home institution. 
State elites do not want to be made redundant. This is why they will generally prefer the European 
regulation of national core state powers to European capacity building: The former potentially adds to 
the role of national officials, while the latter tends to reduce it. In cases where European capacity 
building seems warranted for functional reasons, state elites will prefer intergovernmental 
arrangements that secure a role for national officials in managing the newly created capacities. They 
will be skeptical of supranational architectures that exclusively empower Eurocrats. When they cannot 
prevent the emergence of supranational capacities, they will be tempted to sabotage them. The creation 
of the EEAS, for instance, provoked anxieties of redundancy in many national diplomats. They reacted 
by more or less veiled attempts to tarnish the EEAS’s professional reputation (Adler-Nissen 2014). 
Finally, state elites will prefer sector specific capacities and regulations to more general, cross-sectoral 
arrangements. Institutional fragmentation along sectoral lines helps them demarcate their turf and 
prevent intrusions from other competing departments or bureaus.  
In conclusion, state elites are for the integration of core state powers what private business is for 
market integration: The group of actors most immediately affected and concerned. Yet, in contrast to 
business actors, whose interests are often best served by strong supranational rules and capacities, state 
elites often prefer intergovernmental arrangements with low or no centralized capacities. 
Mass Publics 
There is broad agreement in the extant literature that the EU has become increasingly politicized: 
Mass publics
8
 care for European integration if it affects salient issues of sovereignty, redistribution and 
collective identity. There is no reason to assume that core state powers are salient per se. The 
incremental creation of a European administrative space, for instance, has proceeded in the virtual 
absence of public attention and political contestation. But many issues related to core state powers are 
highly salient, especially if they concern the creation of new European capacities, such as the 
European emergency funds during the Eurozone crisis or the ‘capacity for autonomous action, backed 
up by credible military forces’, requested by the Franco-British St.-Malo declaration in 1998, 
respectively the European Army called for more bluntly by Jean-Claude Juncker recently (Die Welt 
2015).  
                                                     
8
 Mass publics is a general term for a complex phenomenon including mediatized public debates, party competition and the 
mobilization of civil protest (Hutter et al. forthcoming). 
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According to postfunctionalist reasoning, mass politicization typically constrains sectoral demands 
for integration because it brings issues of identity to the fore. If mobilized by party leaders or protest 
entrepreneurs, identity-minded voters tend to resist authority transfers to the European level (Hooghe 
and Marks 2009: 13). Empirically, however, it is not clear that European mass publics are generally 
Euroskeptic. European defense integration, for instance, enjoys consistently high levels of public 
support (Mérand and Angers 2014: 49). In fiscal policy, nine out of ten European voters purportedly 
support more European cooperation as the most effective tool for crisis management. Large majorities 
in all member states, except Britain, support strict fiscal regulations including EU fines for fiscally lax 
member states (European Commission 2013: 21, 27).  
There are also theoretical reasons to doubt that the politicization of identity concerns should always 
work against integration. According to Eurobarometer polls, the people identifying exclusively with 
their home country are in a minority in the EU. A majority thinks of itself, at least sometimes and in 
some respects, as European (Risse 2014: 1208). Distributive interests could potentially also lead to 
mass support for integration. People rightly or wrongly conceiving of themselves as winners of EU 
policies or transfers will likely support integration. Hence, in principle, mass publics can be a source 
of demand for integration as well as an obstacle for integration. We would expect people with strong 
national attachments or deep-seated fears of material loss to demand a low level of integration and to 
prefer regulatory and intergovernmental modes of integration. People with cosmopolitan views or 
strong expectations of material gain may, in turn, be mobilized towards high levels of integration 
involving European capacity building and strong delegation to supranational actors.  
How does mass politicization affect processes of preference formation and aggregation? For 
postfunctionalists, ‘Mass politics trumps interest group politics when both come into play’ (Hooghe 
and Marks 2009: 18). Neofunctionalists and Liberal Intergovernmentalists maintain, by contrast, that 
sectoral interests can prevail even in moments of intense politicization (like the Eurocrisis) because 
spillover dynamics create hard to ignore functional pressures for integration (Niemann and Ioannou 
2015: 197), and governments can keep Euroskeptic publics at bay by various techniques of insulation 
(Schimmelfennig 2014: 336). The evidence from core state powers suggests that both positions are too 
extreme. Governments look for viable compromises between the sectoral interests of business groups 
and state elites (which are often hard to ignore for functional reasons) and mass attitudes (which are 
hard to ignore for electoral reasons) rather than privileging one over the other. The substance and 
shape of these compromises will reflect the domestic constellation of mass attitudes and sectoral 
interests. 
Simplifying greatly, we can distinguish four actor constellations (Figure 2): Mass attitudes and 
sectoral interests (business groups or state elites) can either be aligned in support of, or in opposition 
to, further integration (boxes I and IV), or they can conflict because mass publics oppose integration 
while important sectoral interests support it or vice versa (boxes II and III). Each constellation will 
shape government preferences differently with important implications for intergovernmental 
bargaining, collective institutional choice and the role and function of supranational EU institutions. 
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Figure 2: Actors Constellations in European integration 
  Sectoral interests 
  Pro-integration Contra-integration 
Mass 
publics 
Pro-integration I. Permissive Consensus II. Sectoral resistance 
Contra-integration III. Constraining Dissensus IV. General opposition 
The permissive consensus (cell I) represents the actor constellation more or less explicitly assumed in 
most studies of market integration. It elicits a strong government preference for effective integration. 
The government will defer to supranational leadership and back integration under the Community 
method. This also happens in core state powers. Think, for instance, of the support the large member 
states with competitive defense industries provided for the liberalization of European defense markets 
(Blauberger and Weiss 2013). Standard liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions about the bargaining 
behavior of governments, and standard neofunctionalist assumptions about the entrepreneurship and 
commitment function of supranational institutions apply.  
Sectoral resistance (cell II) refers to a constellation where the general public is more integration-
minded than important sectoral interest. Here, governments will seek to combine public declarations 
of integration-intent with institutional safeguards for national control of future factual integration. For 
instance, the spread of the open method of coordination has been explained by the intention of 
governments ‘to pay symbolic attention to key issues without undertaking any real binding policy 
action’ (Pollack 2002: 397). Much of the EU’s activities in the defense field fit this description, 
combining as they do grand declarations on, for instance, ‘headline goals’ with soft and, as some 
argue, rather ineffective regulation and weak supranational institutions like the EDA (Menon 2014; 
Mérand and Angers 2014). In general, we expect governments to ‘oversell’ integration under 
conditions of sectoral resistance, for example by draping regulatory policies in capacity building 
language (e.g. ‘EU battlegroups’) or by feigning commitment to integration through the creation of 
new but essentially powerless supranational institutions (mock commitment).  
The constraining dissensus (cell III) is the prototypical postfunctionalist constellation. Here 
governments will look for strategies that combine a sufficient level of integration (to satisfy the 
functional needs of sectoral interests) with manageable audience costs (to minimize exposure to 
Euroskeptic mass publics). This often involves policy framing and sometimes double-talk and 
deception. For instance, many economists agree that a sustainable EMU needs a strong European 
fiscal backup. Yet they fear that any obvious attempt to create backup capacity at the EU level must 
founder on public opposition (e.g. de Grauwe 2014: 119). This fear helps to explain the prominence of 
banking union during the Eurocrisis: Breaking the sovereign-banking nexus by strengthening the 
regulatory surveillance of deficient banks seemed like an easier political sell to skeptic publics than 
breaking it by the creation of a fiscal union among the member states. More generally, we would 
expect governments to ‘undersell’ integration under conditions of a constraining consensus by, for 
instance, emphasizing European regulation, by keeping European capacity building to a sheer 
minimum, by organizing capacity building along intergovernmental lines, where it cannot be avoided, 
(think of the new emphasis on several liabilities in institutions such as the ESM or the ECB) or by 
shifting politically controversial decisions to supranational institutions. Under these conditions, 
supranational institutions do not resemble heroic engines of integration that knock over reluctant 
member states in order to advance integration but rather garbage trucks of integration that keep 
integration afloat by disposing of the unresolved problems the member states dump on them. Thus, the 
governments of the member states repeatedly used and abused the ECB as a ‘policy maker of last 
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resort’ in instances in which they could not, or would not, agree among themselves how to handle the 
crisis (Eichengreen 2012: 131). 
Faced with general opposition by mass publics and sectoral interests (cell IV), governments will 
either block integration initiatives at the European level or, if they cannot prevail against the other 
member states, consider an opt-out. Think of the British position during the negotiations of the fiscal 
compact in December 2011, when David Cameron insisted on ‘safeguards’ for the City of London in 
order to satisfy both the financial industry and a largely Euroskeptic public (Bickerton et al. 2014: 13). 
While the domestic politics of this constellation are simple, it tends to lead to considerable 
intergovernmental complications. Differentiated integration and intergovernmental agreements based 
on international (rather than EU) law are the means of choice to cope with these complications.  
We surmise that our typology of actor constellations (Figure 2) can help explain the pattern and 
extent of the integration of core state powers mapped in section 2, and the trend towards institutional 
fragmentation and territorial differentiation associated with it (section 3). It also helps to conceptualize 
the differences between the process dynamics and outcomes of market integration (mostly cell I) and 
of the integration of core state powers (mostly cells 2-4). Obviously, more work is required to show 
this conclusively. This would include not only more comparative research on government reactions to 
different actor constellations but also a more nuanced conception of mass publics that pays closer 
attention to how media discourses, party competition and civil protest movements affect government 
preferences.  
Conclusion  
The uniting theme of the debates on the ‘new intergovernmentalism’ (Bickerton et al. 2014), on 
differentiated integration (Leuffen et al. 2013) and on the mass politicization of EU policies (Hooghe 
and Marks 2009) is fundamental change: The EU is more institutionally complex, less territorially 
coherent, and also less elite-driven than it used to be. We argued that all these changes are empirically 
linked by the EU’s growing involvement in the exercise of core state powers. To support this 
argument, we mapped the pattern and extent of EU involvement, explored its political and institutional 
correlates, and identified causal actor constellations and conditioning constraints.  
Our argument opens two comparative perspectives, one contrasting the European integration of 
core state powers to European market integration, the other comparing it to historical examples of 
federal state building. The former perspective highlights striking differences in the dramatis personae 
of integration – state elites and mass publics rather than sectoral business interests – and raises 
questions about political and institutional consequences. The latter draws attention to the fact that the 
same process that precipitated the institutional, territorial, and political consolidation of national 
federations seems to have the opposite effect on the EU. Perhaps ironically, the more involved the EU 
is in the exercise of core state powers, the less it looks like a state: More integration, less federation!  
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